Hausdorff Dimension of Average Conformal Hyperbolic Sets

The Hausdorff dimension of a conformal repeller or conformal hyperbolic set is well understood. For non-conformal maps, the Hausdorff dimension is only known in some special cases. Ban, Cao and Hu defined the concept of an average conformal repeller which generalises conformal, quasi-conformal and weakly conformal repellers, and they found an equation for the Hausdorff dimension for an average conformal repeller. In this paper we generalise this concept to average conformal hyperbolic sets, and obtain a similar equation for the Hausdorff dimension.Comment: 17 pages, 0 figure

The origins of American resource abundance

American manufacturing exports became increasingly resource-intensive over the very period, roughly 1880-1920, during which the U.S. ascended to the position of world leadership in manufacturing. This paper challenges the simplistic view that the resource-intensity of manufacturing reflected the country''s abundant geological endowment of mineral deposits. Instead, it shows that in the century following 1850 the U.S. exploited its natural resource potentials to a far greater extent than other countries and did so across virtually the entire range of industrial minerals. It argues that "natural resource abundance" was an endogenous. "socially constructed" condition that was not geologically pre-ordained. It examines the complex legal, institutional, technological and organizational adaptations that shaped the U.S. supply-responses to the expanding domestic and international industrial demands for minerals and mineral-products. It suggests that the existence of strong "positive feedbacks"--even in the exploitation of depletable resources--was responsible for the explosive growth of the American minerals economy.economic development an growth ;

GLOBALIZATION RELOADED: AN UNCTAD PERSPECTIVE

This paper rejects the characterization of globalization as an autonomous and irresistible process driven by the impersonal forces of the market and technical progress. Whether domestic or global, market forces are shaped and controlled by policy choices and the institutional frameworks in which they are made. In the absence of adequate institutional frameworks and productive capacities, rapid liberalization is as likely to lead to stagnation and unemployment as to growth and rising incomes per head. We show that the major economic forces presumed to be crucial for spreading the benefits of globalization have been less global than often presented, have proved to be much weaker than widely predicted and carry potentially damaging effects as well as benefits. Accordingly, and without denying that by the late 1970s many developing countries needed to find new ways of inserting themselves into the international economy, we argue that the new policy orientation of macroeconomic stringency, downsizing the public sector and the rapid opening of developing country markets to foreign trade and capital after the debt crisis, has failed to produce an economic environment that supports faster economic growth and strengthens productivity performance. In suggesting the outlines of a more strategic approach to economic development the emphasis is on the need for domestic investment to be mobilized as the basis for industrialization and for a gradual approach to integration with the global economy.

Early Twentieth Century Productivity Growth Dynamics: An Inquiry into the Economic History of “Our Ignorance”

A marked acceleration of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in U.S. manufacturing followed World War I. This development contributed substantially to the absolute and relative rise of the domestic economy's aggregate TFP residual, which is observed when the 'growth accounts' for the first quarter of the twentieth century are compared with those for the second half of the nineteenth century. Two visions of the dynamics of productivity growth are germane to an understanding of these developments. One emphasizes the role of forces affecting broad sections of the economy, through spillovers of knowledge and the diffusion of general purpose technologies (GPT's). The second view considers that possible sources of productivity increase are multiple and idiosyncratic. Setting aside possible measurement errors, the latter approach regards sectoral and economy-wide surges of the TFP growth to be simply the result of which carried more weight than others. Although there is room for both views in an analysis of the sources of the industrial TFP acceleration during the 1920's, we find the evidence more compelling in support of the first approach. The proximate source of the TFP surge lay in the switch from declining or stable capital productivity to a rising output-capital ratio, which occurred at this time in many branches of manufacturing, and which was not accompanied by slowed growth in labor productivity. The 1920's saw critical advances in the electrification industry, the diffusion of a GTP that brought significant fixed capital-savings. But the same era also witnessed profound transformations in the American industrial labor market, followed the stoppage of mass immigration from Europe; rising real wages provided strong impetus to changes in workforce recruitment and management practices that were underway in some branches of the economy before the War. The productivity surge reflected the confluence of these two forces. This historical study has direct relevance for policies intended to increase the rate of productivity growth. In many respects, the decade of the 1920's launched the US economy on a high-growth path that lasted until the 1970's. If we hope to return to the growth performance of that era, we would be well advised to understand how it began.